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1. Introduction 
 
The co-occupation of the same tax bases between layers of government might make 
taxes inefficiently high from a social perspective, if taxes are distortionary (Keen, 
1998). Co-occupation creates a common pool problem. Each sub-central government 
sets taxes without taking into account the erosion of federal revenues, and so 
underestimates the reduction in the level of federal public good provision in its own 
jurisdiction. 
 
In the literature, the presence of vertical tax externalities has been tested by estimating 
the reaction of sub-central government to variations in the federal tax rate. This is an 
indirect test of vertical externality. It implies that the interdependence one might find 
between the state and the federal tax is due to the strategic behavior of the state, which 
reacts to the negative fiscal externality that it is bearing due to a federal tax decision that 
erodes state-tax revenues.1 The empirical results in the literature are somewhat mixed: 
sub-central governments react by increasing or decreasing tax rates, which is coherent, 
to a certain extent, with the ambiguous results obtained in the theoretical literature 
(Keen, 1998; Devereux et al., 2007).  
 
Besley and Rosen (1998) were the first authors to attempt to test for the presence of 
vertical tax externalities in unitary taxes. They tested cigarettes and gasoline and 
obtained a positive reaction in both cases (that was greater for gasoline). Regarding 
cigarettes, Devereux et al. (2007) used a different time period, and in some cases 
estimated different equations (e.g., the lagged endogenous variable and/or taking into 
consideration horizontal tax competition), but did not find a statistically significant 
response, while Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) found a negative response. The results 
for gasoline are not so contradictory: Devereux et al. (2007) found a positive or no 
reaction. In this paper, we will reconsider these estimations, and will thus try to 
reconcile the somewhat contradictory results, which were all obtained for the US case. 
 
In all the studies cited above, the federal unitary tax rate did not show cross-sectional 
variation, as it was transformed into real terms by a national consumer price index 
                                                 
1 Direct tests could also be performed to check for vertical externality by estimating the determinants of 
the tax base. For example Brett and Pinkse (1997, 2000) calculated horizontal externalities using data 
from municipalities in British Columbia (Canada).  
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(CPI). The deflation of a federal tax with a national deflator can give a misleading idea 
of the real tax burden imposed at state level: cost differentials impact the value of a 
federal dollar differently among states. In a federal country like the USA, economic and 
quality-of-life conditions may vary widely according to the area considered. Recent 
discussions in the USA have focused on the fact that high cost areas pay more in real 
terms of income tax for the transfers and federal public goods and services they receive. 
This is because federal income tax is based on nominal income, but its real value varies 
among geographical areas due to differences in the cost of living. In contrast, federal 
transfers and public goods and services are normally indexed using the federal CPI, 
rather than a state cost of living. This asymmetry has generated political attention, as 
well as recent academic interest (Albouy, 2008; Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai, 2006; 
Shapiro, 2006; Glaeser, 1998).  
 
Differences in prices among states can be explained by the general equilibrium trade 
theory (Rosen, 1979; Roback 1982, 1988): the difference in quality of life and in labor 
productivity generates labor migration, and therefore creates gaps in price levels across 
states. Some authors argue that federal taxation should take into account this peculiarity 
through indexation to the cost of living, which is disaggregated by states (Albouy, 
2008). US congressmen from high cost areas have also repeatedly supported proposals 
to index taxes and transfers to regional cost of living (the Tax Equity Act; the Poverty 
Data Correction Act; the COLA Fairness Act), but none of these acts have been passed. 
Similar legislation is proposed every Congress. The most recent proposal was the Tax 
Equity Act of 2005. 
 
Almost all of the political and academic debate has focused on the unfairness of not 
indexing the federal income tax. However, a similar problem could arise with a federal 
unit tax, such as that on gasoline or cigarettes. In this case, given that the nominal unit 
tax on cigarettes and gasoline does not differ among states, high cost areas pay less in 
real terms than low cost areas. Consequently, this bias should be internalized (i.e., an 
absence of regional cost of living indexation for federal taxation) in the different states’ 
expenditure and tax decisions. Namely, states should set their taxes and level of 
expenditure by evaluating the corresponding financial determinants (e.g., the federal tax 
rate), according to the local cost of living.  
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Unfortunately, there is no US general state-price index available. Therefore, we use the 
House Price Index (HPI) to deflate the federal unitary tax rate. The HPI is a broad 
measure of the movement of single-family house prices. It is computed by the Office of 
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight2 (OFHEO), and is a weighted, repeat-sales index, 
which measures average price changes in repeat sales or refinancing on the same 
properties.3   
 
A national deflator might also be used to obtain real federal taxes. However, this creates 
a potential identification problem between the variation in the federal tax rate and 
common shocks. This econometric problem was recognized in previous studies of 
vertical tax competition applied to unitary taxes (Devereux et al., 2007). In particular, 
the impossibility of including time effects potentially creates a specification bias, as the 
estimate of the federal variable might pick up the impact of aggregate shocks. This 
problem disappears if we use the HPI deflator—a price index that shows cross-sectional 
variation—as it allows for the inclusion of time effects to control for shocks. 
 
When we used the HPI, we did not find any vertical response for cigarette taxation or 
gasoline taxation. As shown in Section 2, some of the results of studies that used the 
CPI deflator are dependent on the time period considered. In contrast, once we had 
controlled for common annual shocks, our results did not depend on the time period 
considered. Regarding horizontal tax competition, we found a strong reaction for 
cigarette and gasoline taxes. In particular, in the long term, a 1 cent increase in the 
neighboring states’ tax rates provokes a 0.57 cent increase in the corresponding state’s 
tax rate for gasoline. This reaction was even stronger for cigarettes (a 0.87 cent 
increase). According to Proposition 1 in Devereux et al. (2007), if demand is price-
inelastic, we should expect no vertical reaction and a horizontal reaction of 0.5. Our 
empirical results were consistent with this proposition, as there was no vertical 
response. However, the estimate of 0.5 for horizontal tax competition only applied to 
gasoline. In the case of cigarettes, the well-documented presence of interstate cross-
border shopping and smuggling (Fleenor, 1998; or Farrelly et al., 2003) and the fact that 
this good is easily storable, which implies scale economies in shopping (Scharf, 1999), 
                                                 
2 http://www.ofheo.gov. 
3 This information is obtained by reviewing repeat mortgage transactions on single-family properties 
whose mortgages have been purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac since January 1975. 
For more detailed technical information, see Calhoun (1996). 
 4
might make the horizontal reaction stronger.4 This positive reaction was also obtained 
by Rork (2003). 
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the results 
obtained in the previous literature, which all apply to unitary taxes and to the USA; in 
Section 3 we develop our empirical framework and present the data, and in Section 4 we 
present our results. Finally, a conclusion is given in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Previous literature 
 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main results in the literature on testing the presence of vertical 
interactions for unitary taxes in the USA. Besley and Rosen (1998) obtained a positive 
reaction (row 1, Table 1). Their results were checked by Devereux et al. (2007) and 
Frediksson and Mamun (2008) (rows 2 and 3, respectively). We can see that the results 
are highly dependent on the time span: there was a positive result for the 1977-1997 
period and no reaction for the 1975-2001 period. It is also essential to take into account 
horizontal tax competition and the inertia of state tax rates by including the lagged 
endogenous variable. Then, for the 1977-1997 period, the estimated reaction is no 
longer statistically significant (row 4 and 5). Frediksson and Mamun (2008) excluded 
the 1975-1981 period, because no nominal tax changes occurred during this time. As a 
result, they found that a negative reaction, regardless of further assumptions about the 
estimated equation (row 6 and 7). Consequently, these authors state “the time period 
studied does appear crucial for states’ responses to federal taxes” (p. 43).    
 
This instability of the estimated sign of the state reaction over time might be due to the 
impact of annual common shocks, which are not properly controlled for in the 
aforementioned studies. This was explicitly recognized by Devereux et al. (2007), in 
which they stated that “the presence of federal variables, which vary only over time, 
preclude the use of time dummies which might otherwise capture aggregate shocks 
which create a common effect across states on cigarette tax rates” (p. 466). This creates 
a potential identification problem, in the sense that the key variable in the empirical 
specification (the federal tax rate) might be confused with a linear combination of year 
                                                 
4 For example, when transportation costs are not linear and the price elasticity is still null, the horizontal 
reaction can be higher than 0.5 (Rizzo, 2008). 
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common shocks. In Section 3, we will explain how we try to overcome this 
identification problem.   
 
Table 1. Review of the empirical literature on vertical tax externalities and unitary 
taxes applied to the USA: the case of cigarette taxes 
 Period Time 
dummies 
Endogenous 
lagged 
Horizontal tax 
competition 
(neighbors) 
Sign reaction 
Besley & Rosen (1998); 
Table 3, 1st column 
1975-1989 NO NO NO + (significant) 
Devereux et al. (2007); 
Table 1, 1st column 
1977-1997 NO NO NO + (significant) 
Fredriksson & Mamun 
(2008); Table 5, Model 
III 
1975-2001 NO NO NO + (not significant)* 
Devereux et al. (2007); 
Table 1, 2nd column 
1977-1997 NO YES NO + (not significant) 
Devereux et al. (2007); 
Table 1, 4th column 
1977-1997 NO YES YES + (not significant) 
F & M (2008); Table 3, 
Model I 
1983-2001 NO NO NO - (significant)* 
F & M (2008); 
Table 3, Model VIII 
1983-2001 NO NO YES - (significant) * 
Notes: In all cases, the federal tax is instrumented; (*): not fully comparable, as they include additional control 
variables.  
 
 
With respect to gasoline, the results obtained in the literature are not as contradictory, 
but indicate a positive or no reaction. Table 2 shows these results. Again, Besley and 
Rosen (1998) obtained a positive reaction (row 1, Table 2), which was not robust (row 
2) to expanding the period to 1997 (Devereux et al., 2007). Therefore, the time span 
was again of key importance. This result does not change if we take into account the 
horizontal tax competition and inertia of taxes (row 3 and 4) (Devereux et al., 2007).  
 
Given the ambiguous results obtained in the literature for the same taxes and country, a 
more robust empirical approach is clearly needed to tackle the identification problem, 
which is namely to disentangle the impact of aggregate shocks on the state tax rate from 
variations in the federal tax rate.  
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Table 2. Review of the empirical literature on vertical tax externalities and unitary 
taxes applied to the USA: the case of gasoline taxes 
 Period Time dummies Endogenous 
lagged 
Horizontal tax 
competition 
(neighbors) 
Sign reaction 
Besley & Rosen 
(1998); Table 3, 
2nd column 
1975-1989 NO NO NO + (significant) 
Devereux et al. 
(2007); Table 4, 
1st column 
1977-1997 NO NO NO + (not significant) 
Devereux et al. 
(2007); Table 4, 
2nd column 
1977-1997 NO YES NO + (not significant) 
Devereux et al. 
(2007); Table 4, 
4th column 
1977-1997 NO YES YES + (not significant)* 
(*): However, if the relative horizontal interdependence is based both on neighboring states and on the 
population density at the border, the estimate becomes positive and statistically significant.  
 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
3.1. Empirical framework 
 
 
To test for the presence of vertical tax externalities in the USA, we estimate the tax-
reaction function by relating one state tax to the federal tax for the period 1975-2006. 
We repeat this procedure for gasoline and cigarette taxes. Given that we are dealing 
with unitary taxes, both taxes have to be transformed into real terms.  
 
We then estimate the following equation: 
 
jstjstjstjst
si
jstsitsjst tXTtwt εµβγϕφα ++++++= −
≠
∑ 1                                                      [1] 
 
where jstt  is the real tax rate on commodity j for state s and year t; sα is a state fixed 
effect; tφ  is a year effect; ∑
≠ si
jstsitw  is the average real tax rate for commodity j of the 
neighboring states of state s in year t, where siw are identical exogenous weights, 
normalized such that ∑
≠
=
si
si 1ω , which account for the relative interdependence relation 
between s and the rest i-states; sjtT  is the real federal tax rate for commodity j in year t 
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(without the sub-index s as long as we deflate by CPI); jstX is a vector of state-specific 
time-varying regressors; while jstε  is a mean zero, normally distributed random error. 
As long as the estimate of γ is different from zero, we can confirm the relevance of a 
vertical tax externality.  
 
In order to isolate the independent impact of the federal tax rate on the tax rate of the 
states, we include other variables that might affect the state tax rate and that must be 
taken into account. These variables are included in the vector jstX . In particular, state 
taxation may be influenced by the economic and demographic environment. As usual in 
the literature, this is controlled for by the following variables: population (and its 
square), per-capita income (and its square), unemployment rate, proportion of 
population over 65 and proportion of population between 5 and 17. We also take federal 
fiscal instruments into account, as these may differ from state to state and might 
condition the setting of state tax rates. Thus, we include federal grants-in-aid in relation 
to total population and the federal income tax collected in each state, normalized by the 
adjusted gross income. As we work with real tax rates and nominal tax rates change 
infrequently, we control for inflation. The political affiliation of the state government 
may also affect the tax-rate level. Thus, we divide the US party system into two main 
groups: Republicans and Democrats. We also build dummies for the governors' 
membership in each of the two political groups and variables to account for the 
percentage in the House and Senate of the two groups. 
 
Certain unchanging characteristics of a state are likely to affect its tax system, such as 
climate or geography, among others. We can take these characteristics into account by 
including a dichotomous variable for each state. Changes in the macroeconomic 
situation may also affect states’ fiscal policies. To account for this, we include a set of 
time dummies, unlike previous studies on vertical tax externalities. This is of key 
importance to our paper. As we explain in Section 3.2.2, this is possible as we use a 
state price index to deflate our federal unitary tax. This ensures that the federal tax rate 
has time and cross-sectional variation. Thus, time effects can be included in Equation 
[1]. To date, common shocks in the literature have been controlled by the inclusion of 
federal GDP and federal unemployment, which are only a specific two-linear 
combination of common annual shocks. 
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3. 2. Data 
 
3.2.1 Nominal tax rates 
 
We use annual data on US states from 1975 to 2006. From 1975 to 1983, the federal 
gasoline tax was four cents per gallon. In 1983, the gasoline tax increased to 9 cents, of 
which 8 financed the Highway Trust Fund and 1 funded the Mass Transit Fund. From 
1987, the rate increased by 0.1 to finance the Underground Storage Tank Leakage Fund. 
On 1 December 1990, the tax rate jumped to 14.1, which generated an increase in 
resources for Transportation grants, but also for the specific purpose “deficit reduction”. 
On 1 October 1993, there was a further increase to 18.4, which was only due to an 
increase in the provision of resources to reduce the deficit. The destination of the 
revenue changed from October 1, 1995, as 2.5 cents were redirected to Transportation 
grants and the rate did not change. More funds were provided for Transportation from 
October 1, 1997, since the deficit reduction fund was canceled and the tax rate remained 
unchanged. Therefore, there have been several important statutory tax changes since 
1983, while for the case of cigarettes, no nominal changes occurred prior to this date. 
From 1975 to 1983, the federal cigarette tax rate was eight cents per pack of 20 
cigarettes; from 1983 it was 16 cents per pack. The rate then increased to 20 cents per 
pack in 1991, and 24 cents in 1993. In 2000 it increased by 10 cents and has been 39 
cents per pack since 2002. 
 
Taxes on gasoline and cigarettes vary considerably across states. In 1990, for example, 
the tax per pack on cigarettes ranged from 2 cents in North Carolina to 40 cents in 
Connecticut. In the same year, the tax per gallon of gasoline ranged from 7.5 cents in 
Georgia to 22 cents in Connecticut and Washington. Thus, there is significant cross-
sectional variation.  
 
Taxes on cigarettes vary differently with time according to the state. For example, the 
tax in North Carolina varied from 2 to 5 cents in 1992 and then reached 30 cents in 
2005 and at 35 in 2006. Connecticut shows more variation, as it had a tax of 21 cents 
until 1983, a change to 26 in 1984, then an increase to 40 in 1989, 45 in 1992, 47 in 
1994, 50 in 1995, 111 in 2002 and finally 151 in 2003. Taxes on gasoline also vary 
differently over time according to the state. Georgia, for example, maintained the same 
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tax (7.5) throughout the time period under consideration. In contrast, Connecticut and 
Washington had a major variation over time. Connecticut increased the tax from 10 to 
11 cents per gallon in 1976, from 14 in 1983 to 38 in 1997; followed by a decrease to 36 
in 1998, 32 in 1999 and, finally, to 25 in 2002. Washington levied 9 cents till 1976, 
which rose gradually to 18 in 1984, 22 in 1990 and 23 in 1991. The tax was then 
increased to 28 in 2004, 31 in 2005 and, finally, 34 in 2006.   
 
3.2.2 Real tax rates: CPI vs. HPI  
 
In the previous literature, nominal unitary taxes were divided by CPI to adjust for 
inflation. However, the use of the CPI does not enable us to identify vertical externality. 
This is because it precludes the real federal tax rate from showing cross sectional 
variation, which prevents us from controlling for macroeconomic shocks by using year 
effects. The federal tax could be a particular linear combination of year effects. 
 
However, it is reasonable to consider that prices vary widely across US states and have 
a real impact on federal taxes (see, for example, Albouy, 2008). The increase in the 
federal nominal gasoline tax in 1990 from 9 cents to 14.1 cents did not have the same 
impact in Wyoming as in California. It had a more negative effect on the former than 
the latter, as the price level is higher in California than in Wyoming. Thus, if we use the 
same deflator in both states, the impact of the federal tax rate on the tax decision of 
California may be overestimated with respect to Wyoming.  
 
To resolve this problem, we use the HPI to deflate financial variables. Shapiro (2006) 
showed that house price differentials among states are the prime determinant of cost-of-
living differences. He found that a 10% increase in the implicit price of land increases 
the price of the market basket of goods and services used to compute the CPI by about 
3.2%, with a lower bound of 2.2%. Moreover, Albouy (2008) used a geographical 
partition, as defined by the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and found that in 2000 
“wage and housing prices exhibit a strong positive correlation, with a regression line, 
weighted by employment, having a positive slope near one-half.” (p. 24). Therefore, the 
HPI seems a reasonable proxy for a general state price index. 
 
Figure 1, in which we report the HP indices normalized by their corresponding value in 
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1975, clearly shows that the type of price index affects the real value of the monetary 
variables that determine state-tax choices. However, in some states, the HPI increases 
on average much more than the CPI, particularly after the 1990s. Most of these are 
coastal states (Figure 1). Hence, some caution should be taken in interpreting our 
results, since the volatility of house prices is significantly different in the coastal states 
(Figure 2) from the rest of the US states (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996; Davis and 
Palumbo, 2006; Glaeser et al., 2008). In our empirical analysis, we perform a 
robustness check to test the sensitivity of our results to the exceptional performance of 
house prices in coastal states. 
 
 [FIGURE 1] 
 [FIGURE 2] 
 
3.2.3 The other variables  
 
The rest of the right-hand-side variables of [1], with their definitions, meanings and 
standard deviations are also reported in Table 3. In the following sections, we use data 
that is both normalized by the CPI and by the HPI. In the former case, as previously 
shown in the empirical literature, we control for macroeconomic shocks using the 
national unemployment rate, FEDUNEMP, and the real federal GDP. In contrast, when 
we use the HPI we include year effects.  
 
[TABLE 3] 
 
Next, we include a set of time-varying variables that characterize the state’s economic 
and demographic situation: the state population (POP), per capita state income (INC), 
the state unemployment rate (UNEMP), the proportion of individuals in the state who 
are aged between 5 and 17 (CHILD), and the proportion who are over 65 (AGED). The 
state’s political environment can also affect fiscal outcomes. Therefore, we use a 
dummy variable that equals one if the governor is a Democrat, otherwise we use zero 
(DEMGOV). We also account for the proportions of Democrats in the state Senate and 
House of Representatives (DEMSEN and DEMHOU, respectively). The cigarette and 
gasoline industries can affect the state tax rate by lobbying for the rates of their 
respective commodities (Dixit, 1996). Therefore, we use a measure of importance to the 
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state economy, as in Besley and Rosen (1998), by including TOBINC (tobacco 
production per dollar of state income) and GASINC (gasoline production per dollar of 
state income). The federal fiscal policy, other than commodity tax rates, may also affect 
state commodity tax rates. Thus, we control for per capita federal grants to the states 
(GRANTS), and the average federal income in the state (INCTAX), defined as the ratio 
of the state’s federal income tax liability to its adjusted gross income. Inflation 
(INFLATION) is computed as the annual growth rate in the corresponding price index. 
Finally, we account for state unchanging characteristics by using state fixed effects. 
 
3.3 Empirical strategy 
 
The mean US neighboring tax rate, ∑
≠ si
jstsitw , is endogenous, because it  
can be simultaneously influenced by the tax rate that we are estimating. Then, if this 
was a structural model, a simple OLS estimation of [1] would suffer from endogeneity 
bias: the error term εjst would be correlated with the error terms of the other 
simultaneous equations in the system. In order to overcome the simultaneity bias, we 
use the two-stage least squares method: first, we estimate the reduced forms of the 
endogenous variables, and then we substitute their fitted values into [1]. The residuals 
of this last equation are corrected using the actual values of the endogenous variables. 
We instrument the mean US neighboring tax rate with the US neighboring variables 
POPst, CHILDst, AGEDst, UNEMPst,  DEMSENst, DEMHOUst.  
 
With respect to the federal tax rate, we could also consider that the federal layer and 
state governments set their tax rates simultaneously, which is the case in Devereux et al. 
(2007). In contrast, Besley and Rosen (1998) assume that the federal government is a 
Stackelberg leader and therefore the federal tax rate is exogenous. We take a 
conservative approach and instrument the federal tax rate by using the federal deficit 
over the federal GDP, as Besley and Rosen (1998) did in a robustness check. However, 
when we use the HPI to deflate the federal tax rate and control for year effects, we have 
no federal instrument, and so cannot instrument the federal variable. Consequently, we 
have 7 instruments in total. Hence Equation [1], which has one or two endogenous 
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variables (depending on the deflator we use), is identified.5 
 
4. Results 
 
We started by using the dataset that had been deflated with CPI. The results are shown 
in Table 4. In column (1), we obtained a positive reaction of states to federal tax 
increases. A $1 increase in the federal gasoline tax provoked a $0.37 increase in the 
state tax rate (5% statistically significant). However, this basic result might be biased,  
as we did not control for horizontal tax competition or for the possibility of inertia in the 
setting of state tax rates. Once we had included spatial lag in the basic model, in column 
(2) the reaction due to the vertical tax externality was no longer significant, while a 
strong horizontal reaction emerged (0.95; 1% significant). Finally, in column (3), we 
simultaneously took into account both factors (horizontal tax competition and inertia). 
In this case, vertical tax externality was still not an issue, while the horizontal tax 
reaction strongly diminished (0.24; 1% significant), but was still significant. We 
obtained significant inertia (today’s taxes are almost 80% of yesterday’s taxes). The 
presence of inertia enabled us to differentiate between a short-term reaction in terms of 
horizontal tax competition (0.24), and a long-term reaction (0.24/(1-0.78)=1.09; which 
we cannot reject as equal to 1). 
 
[TABLE 4] 
 
Nonetheless, the above results might be conditioned by the impossibility of fully 
controlling for macroeconomic shocks. As we argued before, the use of a state price 
index enabled us to enrich the previous empirical specification and include a set of time 
effects. This is shown in columns (4) to (6) of Table 4. The previous results were 
basically unchanged. That is, there was no vertical reaction (either in the short-term or 
the long-term), there was a significant degree of inertia (0.79 in column 6; 1% 
significant), and we still detected horizontal interaction, although to a lesser extent (0.12 
in column 6; 1% significant). In this case, the long-term reaction due to horizontal tax 
competition was 0.57 (1% significant). 
                                                 
5 The lag of the dependent variable biases all the estimated coefficients of the regression for finite-T 
samples. However, in our case, the Nickell (1981) bias should not be a significant problem, due to the fact 
that our panel runs over 32 years. Therefore, we do not instrument the lagged endogenous variable. 
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If we compare the statistical tests of column (3) and column (6), we can see that the 
model that includes time effects has greater explanatory power and the test of over-
identifying restrictions performs better. In addition, the long-term reaction for 
horizontal competition seems more reasonable (i.e., the long-term estimate is below 1) 
when we use the HPI. In fact, if we use the HPI, the results obtained are fully consistent 
with Proposition 1 of Devereux et al. (2007): if demand is price-inelastic, the theoretical 
prediction is that there should be no vertical reaction and the reaction due to horizontal 
tax competition should be 0.5, which coincides with our long-term estimate (we cannot 
reject at 1% that the estimate is equal to 0.5). Finally, in both sets of regressions, the 
estimate of inflation was negative. That is, regardless of how inflation was measured 
(national vs. state), states seemed to be reluctant to vary their nominal tax rates in the 
presence of inflation, which is coherent with casual observation and with previous 
literature (Bowmann and Mikesell, 1983; Ang-Olson et al., 1999).  
 
In Table 5, we present the same set of results, but for cigarette taxation. The main 
difference can be seen in the horizontal tax competition, which is stronger in this case. 
This result is qualitatively coherent with that of Devereux et al. (2007). When we used 
the CPI, we obtained a short-term reaction equal to 0.35 (1% significant) and a long-
term reaction equal to 1.54 (1% significant) (column 3). When we used the HPI, we 
obtained 0.22 (1% significant) and 0.87 (1% significant) (column 6), respectively. 
Moreover, when inflation was measured by the CPI, it did not have a significant effect 
on state taxes, that is, the states maintained the level of real tax rates, according to the 
inflation index. However, this result might be misleading, as the CPI-based inflation 
rate does not show cross-sectional variation, and so might mimic other uncontrolled 
factors that also only show time variation. In contrast, an increase in the state price 
index decreases the level of real state taxes, which means that states do not take into 
account variations in the HPI when they set their tax rates, or that states are generally 
reluctant to update their statutory tax rates according to the inflation rate.  
 
Overall, for the period 1975-2006, the main difference between using the CPI and the 
HPI is that the latter index gives a lower estimate of horizontal tax competition. Most 
importantly, its long-term value is below one, which guarantees the existence of a Nash 
Equilibrium in the tax-setting. 
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[TABLE 5] 
 
In the literature review of Section 2, we showed that the time period was of key 
importance for the empirical results, in terms of the vertical tax reaction. We will now 
check whether this is also the case for our empirical approach. To test this approach, in 
Table 6 we compared our results with those obtained by Frediksson and Mamun (2008). 
As we already know from Section 2, these authors obtained a negative reaction for 
cigarette taxation in terms of vertical externality, once they had restricted the period to 
1983 onwards. In other words, they excluded the late 1970s, in which neither the state 
nor the federal government carried out statutory tax changes. In Table 6, we have 
replicated the regressions for the period 1983-01, with the only difference that we 
included the inflation rate and the lagged endogenous variable. We obtained the same 
result: a $1 increase in the federal cigarette tax provoked a $0.48 (5% significant) 
decrease in state taxes. This result was replicated when the inflation rate and the lagged 
endogenous variable were excluded. However, we did not find this result when we 
included a set of time effects. In this case, just as for the whole period, states did not 
react to federal taxes. In Table 6, we also estimated a tax reaction function for gasoline. 
The estimate of the vertical tax externality using CPI was also negative (-0.22, 10% 
significant) and positive but statistically insignificant when we used the HPI. Therefore, 
the negative reaction obtained by Frediksson and Mamun (2008) is not exclusive to 
cigarette taxation, but disappears when we control for aggregate shocks. 
 
[TABLE 6] 
 
According to the results in Section 3.2.2, the time series performance of house prices 
was not equal across states. In particular, in the case of East (Maryland, Delaware, 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York and the states belonging to New England) and 
West (California, Oregon and Washington) coastal states, house prices have suffered an 
exponential increase since the mid-1990s. For example, according to Davis and 
Palumbo (2006), from 1999 till 2004, house prices increased by about 25% in the large 
cities of the Midwest and the Southwest, while in coastal states, they increased by 
around 80%. The trend of house prices in those states is compatible with a generalized 
price increase in all states from 1996 until 2006 (Glaeser et al., 2008). This peculiar 
price behavior in the housing market might make the HPI less reliable as a proxy of a 
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general state price index.  
 
Therefore, in Table 7 we performed a robustness check to test whether our results are 
dependent on that expansionary path of house prices. In columns (1) and (2) we show 
the results excluding the coastal states for gasoline and cigarettes, respectively; while in 
columns (3) and (4) we show results excluding the years from 1996 onwards, again for 
gasoline and cigarettes, respectively. There were no changes in terms of vertical tax 
externality: state tax rates did not respond to changes in the federal tax rate for gasoline 
or for cigarettes. With respect to horizontal tax competition, we still found this to be an 
issue in the US tax setting.  
 
[TABLE 7] 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We tested the impact of an increase in federal tax on state tax in the USA, and provide 
evidence that an increase in the federal tax does not affect state tax rates in the case of 
gasoline and cigarettes. Our results differ from those of previous papers, in which mixed 
results were obtained.  
 
The novelty of our empirical approach is that we can identify the impact of the federal 
tax rate on the state tax rate by using a state-specific deflator, the HPI, which differs 
from the usual CPI as it presents cross-sectional variations. This approach allows us to 
test the impact of the federal tax rate on the state tax rate by controlling for 
macroeconomic shocks, proxied by year effects. This is not possible when the CPI is 
used as a deflator, in which the real federal tax rate is perfectly collinear with a 
particular linear combination of year effects. We developed a test using a data set for the 
USA running from 1975 to 2006 for cigarette and gasoline taxes. 
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Data Appendix 
 
• tst US cigarette tax rate for state s in year t, divided by the CPI or the HPI. These 
rates are taken from www.OTPR.org: cigarette tax rates are expressed in US 
dollars per pack of 20 cigarettes and gasoline tax rates are expressed in US 
dollars per gallon of gasoline. 
 
Endogenous variables 
 
• Tt is the federal US cigarette tax rate. This data is taken from www.OTPR.org. 
• ∑
≠ si
stsitw  is the mean of the states tax rates, divided by the CPI or HPI, of the 
states bordering state s in year t.  
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Demographic and economic variables 
 
• POPst is the number of persons in state s in year t. This figure is taken from 
www.census.gov. 
• CHILDst  is the ratio of individuals aged 5-17 years to the total population of 
state s  in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
• AGEDst  is the ratio of individuals of over 65 years of age to the total population 
of state s in year t, taken from www.census.gov for the USA. 
• UNEMPst is the unemployment rate for state s in year t, taken from 
www.stats.bls.gov. 
• INCst  is the per-capita income for state s in year t divided by the CPI or HPI. 
Income data were taken from http://www.bea.doc.gov. 
• GRANTst is the per-capita federal grant-in-aid for state s in year t. It is obtained 
from "Federal Expenditures by State" which is part of the Consolidated Federal 
Funds Reports program from US Census Bureau. 
• DEMGOVst dummy=1 if the governor of the state is a Democratic, taken from 
the Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• DEMSENst proportion of state Senate that is Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• DEMHOUst proportion of state House that is Democratic, taken from the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• GDPt is the federal GDP for year t divided by the CPI or HPI, taken the 
Statistical Abstracts of the United States. 
• FED UNEMPt is the federal unemployment for year t, taken from the Statistical 
Abstracts of the United States. 
• CPIt (Consumer Price Index) was taken from the Statistical Abstracts of the 
United States (2000). 
• HPIst (House Price Index) was taken from http://www.ofheo.gov, the website of 
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight in the USA. 
• TOBINCst annual tobacco production (thousand of pounds); from 
http://www.nass.usda.gov, the website of the National Agricultural Statistics 
Service in the USA. 
• GASINCst is the daily gasoline production (thousand barrels per day) per dollar 
of state income in real terms with CPI or HPI; from http://www.eia.doe.gov, the 
website of the Energy Information Administration in the USA. 
• INCTAXst federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income. Federal income 
tax and adjusted gross income are from the http://www.irs.gov, the website of 
the Internal Revenue Service, a Department of the Treasury in the USA. 
 
 
 
Table 3: 'Summary statistics*
Variable Obs Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max
tg*10 (state unit gasoline tax, cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 121.487 27.700 37.202 236.760
Tg*10 (federal unit gasoline tax cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 89.653 23.241 41.451 127.336
tc*10 (state unit cigarette tax, cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 216.776 164.998 13.587 1302.276
Tc*10 (federal unita cigarette tax cents in real terms with CPI) 1504 151.423 33.508 82.902 216.787
tg*10 (state unit gasoline tax, cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 97.673 31.177 18.201 201.350
Tg*10 (federal unit gasoline tax cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 74.898 25.379 31.025 147.409
tc*10 (state unit cigarette tax, cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 160.183 89.162 7.990 649.710
Tc*10 (federal unita cigarette tax cents in real terms with HPI) 1504 119.973 33.349 50.480 235.863
GDP (real national gross domestic product , billion of dolllars in real terms with CPI) 1504 45.662 10.138 30.452 65.707
GDP (real national gross domestic product , billion of dolllars in real terms with HPI) 1504 36.121 9.925 15.484 66.492
FED UNEMP (federal unemployment rate) 1504 6.284 1.410 4 9.7
DEF (federal deficit over national gross domestic product) 1504 0.026 0.020 -0.027 0.059
POP(state population*10-6) 1504 5.314 5.577 0.382 36.250
INC (state income per capita*10-3 in real terms with CPI) 1504 140.754 28.405 78.134 251.798
INC (state income per capita*10-3 in real terms with HPI) 1504 110.134 22.616 58.685 197.910
UNEMP (state unemployment rate) 1504 5.984 2.018 2.3 17.4
CHILD (proportion of population between 5 and 17) 1504 0.196 0.021 0.155 0.268
AGED (proportion of population over 65) 1504 0.122 0.019 0.073 0.185
TOBINC (tobacco production per dollar of state income in real terms with CPI) 1504 257.890 925.431 0 10225.09
TOBINC (tobacco production per dollar of state income in real terms with HPI) 1504 323.134 1155.657 0 13393.34
GASINC (daily gasoline production per dollar of state income in real terms with CPI) 1504 0.818 2.703 0.000 31.343
GASINC (daily gasoline production per dollar of state income in real terms with HPI) 1504 0.950 3.211 0.000 35.934
GRANTS (federal grants per capita in dollars*10-8 in real terms with CPI) 1504 563*10-8 226*10-8 231*10-8 2740*10-8
GRANTS (federal grants per capita in dollars*10-8 in real terms with HPI) 1504 444*10-8 199*10-8 151*10-8 2210*10-8
INCTAX (federal income tax divided by adjusted gross income) 1504 0.137 0.016 0.092 0.193
DEMGOV (=1 if the governor is a Democrat) 1504 0.537 0.499 0 1
DEMSEN (proportion of state Senate that is Democratic) 1504 0.577 0.186 0.086 1
DEMHOU (proportion of state House that is Democratic) 1504 0.574 0.179 0.129 1
*Figures are based on annual data for continental US states for the year 1975 to 2006, inclusive. All the monetary variables are espressed in real terms, divideded by
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 1982-84 taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United States or the Housing Price Index (HPI) 1980 taken from the Office of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (http://www.ofheo.gov). We do not include non continental states (Hawaii, District of Columbia and Alaska) and Nebraska,
whose Legislature is unicameral and non-partisan.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fedgastax 0.3703 -0.0563 -0.0968 1.1214 0.7761 0.0875
(2.03)** (0.40) (1.21) (5.87)*** (4.21)*** (0.88)
L1stgastax -.- -.- 0.7820 -.- -.- 0.7934
(33.76)*** (37.23)***
Wstgastax -.- 0.9554 0.2439 -.- 0.5157 0.1170
(6.76)*** (3.06)*** (8.40)*** (2.92)***
inflation -45.0680 -31.3973 -103.3521 -6.0178 -6.6109 -75.1240
(0.58) (0.65) (3.54)*** (0.66) (0.75) (13.07)***
population -4.6474 -2.2657 0.5248 -5.5966 -5.0914 -0.1793
(3.12)*** (1.44) (0.70) (4.37)*** (4.30)*** (0.30)
popsq 0.0928 0.0364 0.0006 0.1307 0.1117 0.0143
(3.96)*** (1.26) (0.05) (6.29)*** (5.13)*** (1.36)
fedgdp -1.2077 -0.1833 -0.2360 -.- -.- -.-
(5.31)*** (0.69) (1.79)*
fedunemp -5.6786 -0.8830 -0.8038 -.- -.- -.-
(7.76)*** (0.86) (1.48)
stinc -0.6079 0.2225 0.0453 1.0672 0.6245 0.0523
(1.22) (0.49) (0.20) (4.30)*** (2.45)** (0.48)
stincsq 0.0017 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0034 -0.0016 -0.0001
(1.35) (0.65) (0.30) (3.53)*** (1.53) (0.26)
stunemp 1.7188 0.2678 0.6687 1.6911 1.1060 0.6162
(3.57)*** (0.48) (1.95)* (3.80)*** (2.44)** (2.04)**
child 219.7473 9.3785 -183.9985 366.3174 103.1825 -1.0938
(2.32)** (0.13) (4.83)*** (5.17)*** (1.34) (0.02)
aged 360.6784 138.8985 31.4811 561.0173 514.2720 120.3130
(1.57) (1.02) (0.42) (5.67)*** (5.32)*** (2.44)**
tobinc -0.0006 -0.0025 -0.0013 0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.41) (1.90)* (1.61) (1.16) (0.13) (0.75)
gasinc -2.1049 -2.0416 -0.2214 -1.8781 -1.6290 -0.2121
(4.63)*** (4.98)*** (1.37) (6.34)*** (5.49)*** (1.60)
grants*10-7 0.0217 0.0212 -0.0179 -0.2102 -0.2175 -0.0340
(0.58) (0.49) (1.05) (3.51)*** (3.52)*** (1.39)
fedinctax -434.8958 -74.6963 -28.4610 -136.5768 -97.2346 -66.3272
(6.53)*** (0.84) (0.62) (1.29) (0.96) (1.17)
demgov -0.3233 0.6197 -0.0328 0.6649 0.3383 -0.0490
(0.35) (0.65) (0.06) (0.84) (0.44) (0.10)
demsen -10.6060 3.4049 2.4677 -11.2628 1.8557 1.4519
(1.65)* (0.56) (0.61) (2.19)** (0.36) (0.41)
demhou 28.5083 3.6513 4.3493 22.5508 11.0005 1.9467
(3.27)*** (0.46) (0.90) (3.45)*** (1.72)* (0.50)
Constant 177.5466 13.8365 50.4767 -217.3821 -146.9240 -13.9351
(2.53)** (0.22) (1.54) (8.15)*** (5.17)*** (0.79)
Observations 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457
r-squared 0.6674 0.6482 0.8909 0.8297 0.8264 0.9428
J-statistics (p-value) -.- 0.1977 0.5709 -.- 0.0901 0.9584
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Two stage least squares regressions where the average of the taxes of the neighbors (Wstgastax) are
instrumented by using the average of the neighbors of AGED, CHILD, STUNEMP, DEMSEN, DEMHOU while
in columns 1-3 FEDGASTAX are also instrumented by means of FED DEF. We use the Hansen-Sargan test to
test for overidentifying restrictions. The J-statistic is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity; Sargan's
statistic is not. Since we use the command "robust" and therefore assume the presence of heteroskedasticity,
which is quite common in a panel for a federal nation such as US, we use, as STATA does, Hansen's J-
statistic, which allows observations to be correlated within groups.
Table 4: Gasoline tax rates (1975-2006), using the CPI and HPI deflator
CPI HPI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
fedcigtax 10.7467 -2.0222 -0.8002 -0.0322 0.1580 -0.0777
(2.68)*** (1.80)* (1.13) (0.09) (0.44) (0.29)
L1stcigtax -.- -.- 0.7805 -.- -.- 0.7484
(15.04)*** (22.19)***
Wstcigtax -.- 1.1248 0.3461 -.- 0.8380 0.2192
(7.42)*** (2.76)*** (8.79)*** (2.95)***
Inflation 5,324.8541 -1,122.2133 -498.2441 -62.7194 -50.3215 -139.9674
(2.88)*** (1.86)* (1.36) (2.27)** (1.88)* (7.49)***
population -44.6609 46.7264 22.4808 -7.4145 6.2988 4.2950
(1.89)* (3.14)*** (2.55)** (1.07) (0.91) (0.83)
popsq 0.7951 -0.8584 -0.4151 0.1308 -0.1803 -0.0842
(1.84)* (2.94)*** (2.59)*** (0.97) (1.33) (0.90)
fedgdp -8.9289 4.9995 1.4392 -.- -.- -.-
(0.84) (2.38)** (1.16)
fedunemp -24.6514 5.9440 6.6098 -.- -.- -.-
(1.12) (1.20) (2.42)**
stinc -8.0413 -2.2188 0.5332 1.1221 0.2137 0.4060
(1.96)** (0.97) (0.44) (1.52) (0.28) (0.72)
stincsq 0.0267 0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0018 -0.0001 -0.0006
(2.60)*** (0.63) (0.39) (0.74) (0.02) (0.34)
stunemp 9.5487 -4.1719 -0.7096 2.4382 0.2739 -0.0517
(1.19) (1.49) (0.47) (1.67)* (0.19) (0.06)
child -514.0419 -238.2661 -183.3021 1,770.8212 657.3963 7.9823
(0.63) (0.61) (0.87) (6.50)*** (2.07)** (0.04)
aged 3,902.0920 -2,188.9863 -564.1070 1,844.6291 663.3671 417.4967
(1.50) (2.71)*** (1.07) (4.31)*** (1.50) (1.41)
tobinc 0.0442 -0.0092 -0.0002 0.0072 -0.0005 0.0023
(1.93)* (1.36) (0.04) (2.12)** (0.20) (1.13)
gasinc -4.3098 0.7157 -0.3734 -3.2934 -2.7680 -1.4349
(0.83) (0.31) (0.23) (3.08)*** (2.73)*** (1.73)*
grants*10-7 -3.0262 0.6006 0.3377 -0.7449 -0.3638 -0.1472
(2.28)** (1.19) (1.20) (3.98)*** (1.46) (0.94)
fedinctax 4,002.3267 -326.3991 -496.3470 481.7771 245.3470 239.0337
(2.39)** (0.64) (1.68)* (1.19) (0.61) (0.82)
demgov 6.3217 18.1995 6.0954 15.1482 11.8395 3.9283
(0.51) (2.90)*** (1.64) (4.55)*** (3.57)*** (1.74)*
demsen 75.7224 60.3804 22.1756 22.2099 29.4601 9.5122
(0.97) (1.77)* (1.11) (1.10) (1.38) (0.70)
demhou 94.7299 67.9774 38.5570 127.3979 29.7572 19.2426
(1.00) (1.26) (1.34) (4.62)*** (0.94) (0.89)
Constant -1,345.1463 341.4636 -7.2574 -673.5114 -320.1579 -144.3115
(1.86)* (1.27) (0.05) (6.73)*** (3.00)*** (1.95)*
Observations 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457 1457
r-squared 0.2717 0.6575 0.8770 0.6636 0.6495 0.8337
'J-statistics (p-value) -.- 0.1449 0.4895 -.- 0.0000 0.2330
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Years effects NO NO NO YES YES YES
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: See Table 4. 
Table 5: Cigarette tax rates (1975-2006), using the CPI and HPI deflator
CPI HPI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
stgastax stcigtax stcigtax stgastax
fedtax -0.2224 -0.4842 0.2695 0.1756
(1.91)* (2.01)** (1.16) (0.96)
L1sttax 0.6354 0.7052 0.7013 0.6447
(17.97)*** (12.91)*** (15.47)*** (18.22)***
Wsttax 0.4235 0.4163 0.3099 0.1689
(3.46)*** (2.71)*** (3.07)*** (2.07)**
inflation -16.5453 -117.4722 -119.3227 -71.5054
(0.33) (0.55) (5.23)*** (7.04)***
population -2.2327 20.9977 10.4939 -3.2568
(1.20) (2.71)*** (2.08)** (2.11)**
popsq 0.0644 -0.1972 -0.1074 0.0756
(1.77)* (1.15) (0.94) (2.91)***
fedgdp 0.1160 0.2462 -.- -.-
(0.31) (0.12)
fedunemp 1.6601 2.7140 -.- -.-
(1.19) (0.76)
stinc 0.6595 -1.5851 -0.0333 0.3483
(1.73)* (1.12) (0.07) (1.60)
stincsq -0.0017 0.0035 -0.0015 -0.0008
(1.65)* (0.97) (0.82) (0.98)
stunemp 0.6617 -1.0418 0.1751 0.5968
(1.17) (0.82) (0.22) (1.21)
child -42.0604 -461.6379 133.5096 -1.7427
(0.51) (1.71)* (0.63) (0.02)
aged 122.8587 -540.7688 356.1837 178.7325
(1.05) (1.34) (1.53) (1.75)*
tobinc -0.0024 -0.0029 -0.0013 -0.0025
(1.46) (1.05) (0.77) (1.85)*
gasinc 0.1001 1.7110 -0.6128 -0.4505
(0.11) (1.12) (0.66) (0.70)
grants*10-7 -0.0050 0.5298 0.2487 -0.0524
(0.09) (2.02)** (1.37) (0.67)
fedinctax 80.1320 196.0545 350.6625 90.8697
(0.82) (0.56) (1.24) (1.12)
demgov 0.2847 0.3088 0.1076 0.7354
(0.31) (0.12) (0.06) (0.96)
demsen -6.0503 9.7931 -7.2009 -3.4406
(1.06) (0.53) (0.48) (0.63)
demhou 3.5102 -8.5052 1.0711 0.2833
(0.56) (0.35) (0.06) (0.05)
Constant -59.1895 197.8748 -183.9587 -34.5520
(0.91) (1.64) (2.50)** (1.33)
Observations 893 893 893 893
r-squared 0.8908 0.8961 0.8982 0.9415
'J-statistics (p-value) 0.3591 0.4071 0.3450 0.3334
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Years effects NO NO YES YES
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: See Table 4. 
Table 6: Gasoline and cigarette tax rates (1983-2001), using the CPI and HPI 
deflator.
 83-01 CPI 83-01 HPI
(1) (2) (3) (4)
stcigtax stgastax stcigtax stgastax
fedtax 0.2319 0.1608 0.0155 0.2533
(0.65) (1.18) (0.06) (1.27)
L1sttax 0.7269 0.7800 0.7551 0.7523
(14.87)*** (30.36)*** (24.85)*** (26.75)***
Wsttax 0.3502 0.1423 0.0949 0.0701
(2.65)*** (2.07)** (2.00)** (1.73)*
inflation -149.8047 -75.3660 -115.8719 -77.2606
(6.22)*** (9.47)*** (8.23)*** (11.37)***
population -0.5298 0.3994 3.9908 -2.5119
(0.04) (0.40) (0.58) (2.17)**
popsq 0.1388 0.0109 -0.0306 0.0553
(0.25) (0.31) (0.23) (2.22)**
stinc 0.2477 0.1244 -0.1085 0.2863
(0.37) (0.91) (0.28) (1.75)*
stincsq -0.0009 -0.0005 0.0013 -0.0010
(0.45) (1.11) (1.32) (1.91)*
stunemp -0.6926 0.6556 0.6014 0.5104
(0.58) (1.81)* (0.76) (1.43)
child 53.0420 -12.5046 134.6258 -4.5262
(0.23) (0.23) (0.89) (0.06)
aged 615.0438 72.4076 399.3648 260.9417
(1.59) (1.21) (1.88)* (2.76)***
tobinc -0.0004 -0.0004 0.0011 -0.0001
(0.21) (0.86) (1.18) (0.19)
gasinc -0.7588 -0.1154 -0.5124 -0.8348
(0.94) (0.64) (0.86) (3.29)***
grants*10-7 -0.2018 -0.0113 -0.2187 -0.1494
(1.12) (0.45) (1.45) (1.99)**
fedinctax 306.7781 -75.0355 -130.5880 -153.8064
(0.80) (0.98) (0.67) (1.59)
demgov 3.8180 -0.1186 -2.7824 -0.1893
(1.28) (0.19) (1.71)* (0.25)
demsen -0.0745 -1.1276 1.7605 -1.6200
(0.00) (0.24) (0.16) (0.35)
demhou 6.2807 2.9448 20.8194 5.7902
(0.20) (0.59) (1.29) (1.01)
Constant -150.7825 -7.6221 -68.9462 -30.5209
(2.04)** (0.42) (1.12) (1.15)
Observations 1054 1054 940 940
r-squared 0.8229 0.9364 0.8975 0.9214
'J-statistics (p-value) 0.3188 0.4464 0.9199 0.1708
Fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Years effects YES YES YES YES
Robust z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Without East and West coastal 
states Period: 1975-1995
Table 7: Robustness check: regressions without coastal states and for the period 
1975-1995, using the HPI deflator.
Notes: See Table 4. 
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Figure 1: Time evolution of CPI vs. HPI (1975-2006)
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Figure 1 (cont.):  Time evolution of CPI vs. HPI (1975-2006)
 
 
 
Figure 2: Standard deviation of HPI (1975-2006) 
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